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Declaring War on the Japanese
Constitution: Japan's Right to Military
Sovereignty and the United States' Right
to Military Presence in Japan
BY DEREK VAN HOFEN*

Introduction
On November 25, 2001, two Japanese naval ships left Yokosuka
headed for the Indian Ocean. The forces had been sent to provide
logistical support to the international war in Afghanistan, a response
to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. In the
process, however, this seemingly innocuous event resurrected a
pressing legal issue that has occupied Japan for the last half-century.
An analysis of the Japanese military and its relationship with the
United States military necessarily involves an analysis of historical
events, legal issues and international law. Specifically, it involves a
detailed examination of the United States' post-war occupation of
Japan and the new U.S.-drafted Japanese constitution that followed;
of the intricacies of that constitution, including its renunciation of the
right to belligerency or to maintenance of armed forces; of internal
and external pressures to amend or reinterpret that constitution; of
practical realities such as diplomacy, self-defense and economic
growth; of the legitimacy of a document called a constitution, for both
its own citizens and the international community; of the validity of
international treaties; and of the character or existence of
international law.
Such an endeavor would naturally fill volumes in a variety of
journals. For purposes of this note, then, the analysis will focus
primarily on two main topics: first, the right of Japan to amend its
* J.D.
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constitution or to maintain armed forces without amendment, and
what that means for constitutional legitimacy; and second, the right of
the United States to maintain a military presence in Japanese
territory, and what that means for international treaties and
international law. The difficulty in this study lies in the ramifications
that follow approval of either path. On the one hand, to argue that
Japan has the right either to maintain armed forces or to amend its
constitution is to strip constitutions of their legitimacy, at least as far
as international law is concerned. Yet, to endorse the contrary view is
to contend that one military defeat submits a country to the whim of
its conquerors in perpetuity. Perhaps there is a middle ground,
although any approach invariably risks concluding with the ultimate
international law maxim: "might makes right." This note concludes
by arguing that in fact might does make right, at least insofar as it
dictates the United States' right to continued military presence in
Japan and the Japanese right to amend its constitution and maintain
military forces.
I. The Japanese Constitution and its Origins
"Chapter II: Renunciation of War
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized."'
Interpreted literally, the Japanese constitution precludes the
nation from maintaining military forces of any kind. If "land, sea and
air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained," it
would be virtually impossible for the nation to develop and keep a
military force of any kind. However, an historical account of the era
shows that the constitution was not intended to be taken literally. As
we shall see, it has been the ambiguous nature of Article 9 and the
competing interpretations of it that have generated such controversy,
and yet still allowed for the development and maintenance of a
1. JAPAN CONST., art.

9.
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sizable Japanese military over the past 55 years.
When the constitution and Article 9 were being drafted and
debated, those involved disagreed on its intended scope. Some saw it
as a clear renunciation of all military capabilities, including the right
of self-defense 2 ; others saw it as prohibiting only aggressive war, but
still preserving the right to defend the nation.3 To understand the
context of Article 9, it is important also to understand the nature of
the American post-war occupation of Japan. From unconditional
surrender in the Fall of 1945 until April 1952, the United States
occupied Japan. In attempting to characterize the sentiments of the
era, one historian has described the occupation this way: "However
high minded they may have been, General MacArthur and his
command ruled their new domain as. neocolonial overlords, beyond
challenge or criticism, as inviolate as the emperor and his officials had
ever been."4 Indeed, this quote illustrates the complete subjugation
and capitulation of the Japanese following World War II.
This is important primarily to put Article 9 of the constitution in
context. In addition to unconditional surrender, popular sentiment in
Japan at the time was intense war weariness. One historian has
described Article 9 as "possess[ing] a compelling psychological
attraction to a shattered people sick of war and burdened by the
knowledge that much of the world reviled them inherently militaristic
and untrustworthy."6 The horrific scope of the war's devastation
drives home this point: "All told, probably at least 2.7 million
servicemen and civilians died as a result of the war, roughly 3 to 4
percent of the country's 1941 population of around 74 million."7 Just
as significant, "[m]illions more were injured, sick, or seriously
malnourished.... [T]he Allied assault on shipping and the bombing
campaign destroyed one-quarter of the country's wealth."8 In
addition, "[s]ixty-six major cities.., had been heavily bombed,
destroying 40 percent of these urban areas overall .... In Tokyo, the
largest metropolis, 65 percent of all residences were destroyed....
2. See OSAMU NISHI, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW
SYSTEM INJAPAN (1987).

3. Id.
4.

JOHN W.

WAR II 27 (1999).
5. See id.
6. Id. at 398.
7. Id. at 45.

8. Id. at 45.

DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD
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Close to 9 million people were homeless."'
Thus, the Japanese themselves were eager to become a peaceloving nation free of war, and this colored their thoughts on the
constitution and Article 9. The preamble of the constitution reads:
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and
are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling
human relationship, and we have determined to
preserve our security and existence, trusting in the
justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the
world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an
international society striving for the preservation of
peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery,
oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth.
We recognize that all peoples of the world have the
right to live in peace, free from fear and want."
However, this did not resolve the debate over whether Article 9
allowed self-defense forces or no forces at all.
At first glance, it seems odd to envision a constitution that
precludes even the right of self-defense. However, many Japanese
officials interpreted the constitution as doing just that: "The war
renouncing article seems to justify the right of self-defense; however,
I find it too dangerous to recognize such a right. Many recent
conflicts have occurred under the guise of defense. Thus the
recognition of self-defense will only invite war."" Other officials
interpreted the Article only slightly differently:
The war renouncing article does not directly reject the
right of self-defense. However as Paragraph 2 of
Article 9 denies all armaments and the right of
belligerency of the state, wars based on the right of
self-defense and the right of belligerency are
renounced. By voluntarily renouncing the right of
belligerency we establish the basis of world peace.'2
9. Id. at 45-47.
preamble.
11. NISHI, supra note 2, at 5 (quoting "A reply to a question posed by Sanzo
Nosaka, Japan Communist Party, 'Shouldn't a rightful war of self-defense be
recognized?', House of Representatives, June 28, 1946.").
12. Id. at 5 (quoting "A reply to a question made by Fujiro Hara, Japan
10. JAPAN CONST.,
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Some officials directly addressed the difficulty this presented
regarding defending an attack: "Since we have renounced the right of
self-defense, we are left without a means of defense in case of foreign
attacks and are thus forced to entrust our faith to other nations for
the security and survival of our state. Unable to maintain its
existence without relying upon international good will our nation has
lost its character as an independent state."'3 At the same time, many
Japanese understood Article 9 as a complete and permanent ban on
military forces:
So as never to participate in a war again, our new
constitution has made two decisions.
The first
prohibits maintenance of soldiers, warships and
warplanes. Thus Japan will never have an army, navy
or air forces. The second forbids us to carry our
points across through wars with foreign nations. This
is because wars are self-destructive. Japan will
prosper if it is on good terms with other nations of the
world and if they become good friends. 4
Still, despite these viewpoints, the majority of those involved
understood Article 9 to renounce only aggressive wars, and to
preserve the right of self-defense. The strongest evidence comes from
the enactment process of Article 9. MacArthur's first proposed draft
included the language: "War as a sovereign right of the nation is
abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its
disputes and even for preserving its own security.... No Japanese
Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized."' 5 However, the
final, adopted draft of Article 9 did not include MacArthur's language
regarding the right of self-defense. Charles Kades, the Deputy Chief
of the Government Section at the time, explained why the language
was removed:

Progressive Party, 'How should an independent nation cope with aggression?' House
of Representatives Committee, June 26, 1946.").
13. Id. at 6 (quoting Tatsukichi Minobe, SHIN KEMPO GAIRON, AN OUTLINE OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTION (Yuhikaku Co., Ltd., April 1947.).
14. Id. at 6 (quoting ATARASHII KEMPO NO HANASHI (Topics ON THE NEW
CONSTITUTION) published by the Ministry of Education in February 1948.).
15. Id. at 7-8.
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The reason why I omitted the words 'even for
preserving its own security' is that it seemed to me it
was not realistic to say that if Japan were attacked, it
could not defend itself. I felt that every country has
the right of self-preservation. Even if they didn't have
arms and ammunition, they could fight with bamboo
sticks.... If some foreign force landed on the shores
of Japan, they didn't
need to lie down and let invaders
6
walk over them.

The final draft of Article 9 included the words at the beginning of
the clause: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order."' 7 This so-called Ashida amendment has given
great weight to arguments that Japan may maintain military forces for
the purpose of self-defense.
Hitoshi Ashida, author of the
amendment and chairman of the committee on constitutional
revision, has commented: "The wording of this amendment lacks
clarity. However, this proposal contains much significance. By
inserting the words, "For the above purpose," to [sic] the original
draft, we may clearly recognize that it 8does not indicate an
unconditional renunciation of military force."'
From the standpoint of constitutional analysis, Article 9 has
indeed been subject to competing interpretations. The Japanese
government's interpretation is most instructive:
[The government] approves defensive wars but does
not recognize maintenance of war potential even for
the purpose of self-defense. How then is a defensive
war to be conducted? It is through the possession of a
self-defense force not exceeding the capacity of war
potential.... The government explains that war
potential is 'one which exceeds the minimum
requirement for self-defense' and as today's SDF (Self
Defense Forces) do not exceed this limit, Japan does
not maintain war potential, which the constitution
prohibits.19
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 9.
JAPAN CONST., art. 9.
NISHI, supra note 2, at 10.

Id. at 12.
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(The important element through the years has been the evolving
definition of "war potential," allowing for greater and greater
expansion of the SDF.2 °) Nishi groups the various interpretations into
six different categories, ranging from no maintenance of military
forces whatsoever to shaping Article 9 to meet the needs of the nation
at a given moment. 21
Regardless of the variety of interpretations, the most important
fact to have emerged is that Japan has built a formidable military
force under the name of the "Self-Defense Forces., 22 Inaugurated in
1954, the SDF does not violate the constitution, according to the
Japanese government.23 The government's stance on the SDF is as
follows: "
The Constitution renounces wars. However, it does
not renounce wars for purposes of self-defense.
Obstruction of armed interventions from abroad is in
itself self-defense, and its essence differs from that of
solving international disputes. Thus defending the
nation through the use of arms in case of foreign
attacks does not violate the Constitution. Article 9
recognizes the right of self-defense of Japan, an
independent nation. Hence the Self-Defense Forces,
whose mission is to defend the nation, and the
establishment of a capable corps with the necessary
limits to serve the purpose of self-defense do not
violate the Constitution in any way.24
In addition, the government issued detailed explanations of what
is and is not authorized under Article 9 with regard to the SDF,
including dispatching troops overseas, enemy base attacks, the
maintenance of nuclear arms and the right of collective self-defense.25
Most notably, "overseas dispatches with the purpose of sending
20. Matthew J. Gilley, Comment. Japan's Developing Military Potential Within
the Context of its ConstitutionalRenunciation of War, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1681
(1998).
21. NISHI, supra note 2, at 13.
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 16-17.
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troops who do not resort to arms, are not prohibited under the
Constitution."26 This interpretation allowed for the deployment of
the naval vessels to assist the international war inside Afghanistan
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The developments over the years demonstrate that Article 9 is
certainly not static, and that Japan does not interpret the Article to
preclude maintenance of military forces. A cursory glance at the
country's military stature reveals a status in stark contrast with that
contemplated, even by the most hawkish officials, in 1947. Japan
27
currently spends roughly the same amount as Britain on its military,
an amount which places the country third in the world behind only
the United States and Russia." In addition, Japan's ground forces
total over 150,000, also roughly equivalent to Britain.9
More
impressive, though, is Japan's rapid evolution to modern military
power: "The Ground Self-Defense Force now has 1,150 tanks, the
Maritime Self-Defense Force over 50 destroyers and 15 submarines,
and the MSDF and Air Self-Defense Force together have 473 combat
aircraft."' Together, this makes Japan one of the most modern and
powerful military forces in Asia.'
The slow but steady growth in Japan's military industry reflects a
tension that has plagued the country since occupation ended. On the
one hand, there has been growing international pressure to assume
the military responsibility that comes with being an economic power
in the world, despite any perceived constitutional limitations.32 On
the other hand, there are those who would lend more legitimacy to
Article 9, and who remember Japanese aggression in World War II
more clearly, who remain steadfastly opposed to what historian John
Dower has called Japan's "creeping remilitarization under America's
nuclear umbrella., 33 Internally as well, there has been a palpable
conflict over what role the Japanese military should play. One faction
resents the omnipresent U.S. military on Japanese soil and would
hasten a quicker return to national sovereignty,34 while the other
26. Id.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

REINHARD DRIFrE, JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

34 (1990).

Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
See Gilley, supra note 20.
DOWER, supra note 4, at 29.
Toni M. Bugni, Note, The Continued Invasion: Assessing the United States
Military Presence on Okinawa Through 1996, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 85
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faction appreciates the security that American forces provide as well
as the economic benefits of not having to allocate an even larger
percentage of GNP to the military.35
These disagreements are best understood within the context of
the various U.S.-Japan security treaties over the past half-century.
While the specifics of the treaties vary, the general theme is that the
United States provides military support for Japan in turn for Japan
allowing the United States to use Japanese soil for bases.36 Historian
Reinhard Drifte has characterized the relationship as such:
In the security area, it was assumed that a very gradual
increase of defense expenditures would be sufficient
to ensure the continuity of the two-track model; that
is, Japan would be able to concentrate on the
economy, while the United States would take the
ultimate responsibility for Japan's security.
In
exchange, Japan would support the major goals of
American foreign and security policies and provide
bases in Japan.37

Even U.S. interests have not been so clear. On the one hand, the
initial goal was to prevent remilitarization of Japan so as to avoid
repeats of World War II aggression.38 However, as early as 1950, with
the onset of the Korean War, the U.S. began to rethink its policy and
encouraged the Japanese to establish troops for its self-defense.36
MacArthur himself - who had advocated a draft of the constitution
which would have precluded even self-defense forces - phrased it this
way in an address to the Japanese on New Year's Day 1950: "Article
9 is based upon the highest of moral ideals, but by no sophistry of
reasoning can it be interpreted as complete negation of the
inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack."4°
MacArthur added, "[i]t is a ringing affirmation, by a people laid
prostrate by the sword, of faith in the ultimate triumph of

(1997).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

DRIFFE, supra note 27, at 36-37.

Id.
Id. at 28.
See NISHI, supra note 2.
Id. at 14-15.
Id.
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international morality and justice without resort to the sword."4
Forty years later, the United States had company in calling for an
increased role in Japanese military participation in international
affairs.42 With the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War, Japan received
wide criticism for its failure to commit troops to the coalition,
resorting instead to financial support. 3 David Leheny notes that
"American requests for increased Japanese military commitments
under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty have not fallen on deaf ears, but
they have sometimes seemed to reverberate off political issues linked
only tangentially to questions of national defense."44 In regards to
specific events, Leheny adds, "although Japan's commitment of $13
billion to the Allied effort in the Persian Gulf War dwarfed that of
most other nations, its perceived dithering over constitutional issues
left many convinced it was unprepared to accept a genuine political
role in the post-Cold War world."45 In addition, "critics both at home
and abroad referred derisively to the nation's 'checkbook diplomacy'
and its unwillingness
to risk lives even to support collective security
46
arrangements."
In many respects, Japan cannot win. When it has expanded its
SDF forces, the country has been subject to harsh criticism from its
Asian neighbors, to say nothing of the domestic defenders of Article
9.47 In addition, Japan has faced competing pressures regarding the
amount it spends on its military. Until 1987, the country officially
observed a cap of one percent of GNP on its defense budget. 48 When
it finally abandoned this limitation, it once again received a harsh
response from internal opponents as well as wary neighbors.49 (This
occurred in spite of the fact that the removal of the spending cap was
more ceremonial than anything else; in fact spending failed to exceed
one percent over the ensuing years."')
The critical element of these historical developments is the
gradual growth and evolution of the Japanese military in spite of
41. Id. at 15 (quoting DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, Reminiscences, 304, 1964).
42. David Leheny, Tokyo Confronts Terror, POLICY REVIEW, December 2001 &
January 2002.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 38.
47. Id. at 40.
48. DRIFTE, supra note 27, at 34.
49. Id.
50. Id.

2003]Japan's Right to Military Sovereignty: U.S. Right to Military Presence in Japan

299

Article 9. Up to this point, although debate has continued, resolution
has evaded the parties involved. The Japanese courts have done their
best to avoid the political question of constitutional interpretation."
The government's approach has been to reinterpret Article 9 in a
manner that satisfies as many parties as possible without upsetting the
balance. 2 While this strategy has sufficed up to now, it is doubtful
that Japan can continue indefinitely without a serious and resolute
consideration of the constitutional implications of its military growth.
The latest developments in the U.S-Japan treaty relationship
highlight this point.53
II. U.S.-Japan Security Treaties
If the general trend since the end of occupation has been
expansion of Japanese forces and a reduction in the U.S. presence in
Japan,54 the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation
represent the continuation of that theme.5 The initial U.S.-Japan
security treaty in 1951-52 established the theme that has characterized
the relationship between the countries ever since: "The Japanese-U.S.
Security Treaty... provided Japan with cost-effective security
protection, in return for which the country had to provide the United
rearmament
States with military bases in Japan and to shoulder
56
commitments of its own, tailored to U.S. needs.
The 1997 Guidelines, though, introduce more substantial change
in the form of increased roles for Japanese forces, than any of the
In particular, the Guidelines create a more
previous treaties.
pronounced role for Japanese forces in two main areas: "expanding
the idea of self defense to situations in areas surrounding Japan" and
"expansion of the areas in which the Japanese military may
operate. ',' As far as the first area is concerned, the Guidelines state
that "situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important

51. NISHI, supra note 2, at 19-29.
52. LEHENY, supra note 42, at 39.
53. Id.
54. See Gilley, supra note 20.
55. Joint Statement on Review of Defense Cooperation Guidelines and Defense
Cooperation Guidelines, Sept. 23 1997, U.S.-Japan, 36 I.L.M. 1621 XXXX
[hereinafter Defense Cooperation Guidelines].
56. DRIFTE, supra note 27, at 6.
57. See Gilley, supra note 20.
58. Id. at 1716.
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influence on Japan's peace and security."59 This presents a potentially
expansive role for the SDF, which previously was authorized only to
repel attacks on Japanese territory."
The potential danger with the new guidelines is in allowing
liberal interpretations of what constitutes an area surrounding Japan.
For example, is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan considered an area
surrounding Japan such that the SDF would be authorized to
intervene in the interests of self-defense? What about perceived
Chinese aggression that falls short of an actual invasion? After all,
when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, it did so under the
auspices of self-defense.6 ' It was precisely this loose logic that many
feared in 1947 when they argued against allowing even self-defense
forces for fear that they could eventually be extended to aggressive
forces.62
In other words, "The 1997 Guidelines are significant in that they
appear to provide for an expanded role of Japan's military in the
defense of the Japanese Home Islands. Stated differently, the
Guidelines provide for an expanded notion of what it means to
defend Japan - extending the concept of defense beyond the Home
Islands."63 The purported goal is slightly more restrained:
The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis
for more effective
and credible U.S.-Japan
cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an
armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas
surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a
general framework and policy direction for the roles
and missions of the two countries and ways of
cooperation and coordination, both under normal
circumstances and during contingencies.64
The drafters of the Guidelines were not unaware of the potential

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See DOWER, supra note 4.
62. NISHI, supra note 2, at 5 (quoting "A reply to a question posed by Sanzo
Nosaka, Japan Communist Party, 'Shouldn't a rightful war of self-defense be
recognized?', House of Representatives, June 28, 1946.").
63. Gilley, supra note 20, at 1708.
64. See Defense Cooperation Guidelines, supra note 55.
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constitutional implications that might result:65 "Japan will conduct all
its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance
with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively
defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles."'
However, as history has shown since 1947, Japan has been willing to
be flexible in interpreting its constitution to avoid conflict.
An additional section of the 1997 Guidelines poses a different
problem in light of the constitution: Japan's Support for U.S. Forces.67
While the Guidelines claim to restrict Japan's military scope to its
own territory, they clearly introduce the possibility of expansion into
new and un-chartered waters.' The Guidelines state: "By its very
nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in
Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas."69
Again, the terminology presents potential problems regarding the
precise definition of "high seas." As Matthew Gilley notes:
Instead of being confined to the territorial sea or the
contiguous zone, Japan recognizes the possibility that
it may need to conduct naval operations on the high
seas (more than 200 nautical miles from the coastal
baseline). In addition to providing rear area support
on the high seas, Japan is bound to bilaterally conduct
operations in 'surrounding waters' to protect sea lanes
of communication. At the very least, the explicitly
stated possibility of conducting or even supporting
operations in such areas is a marked departure from
prior notions about Japan's role in providing for its
own defense."7

The new Guidelines also grant Japan the right to use international
airspace in responding to perceived threats, a significant advancement
in the scope of its military range, one that also suggests potential
constitutional conflicts.71
As the United States and Japan continue to develop their
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Gilley, supra note 20, at 1709.
Defense Cooperation Guidelines, supra note 55 at 1625.
Id. at 1630.
Gilley, supra note 20, at 1711.
Defense Cooperation Guidelines, supra note 55 at 1632.
Gilley, supra note 20, at 1711.
Id. at 1712.
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increasingly interdependent military relationship in the form of
revised Guidelines and treaties, both countries have also seen
increased agitation calling for American withdrawal from Japanese
territory.72 As mentioned above, many Americans have grown
frustrated with Japan's refusal to assume greater military
responsibility, in spite of the American role in creating the Japanese
constitution.73 More important, though, has been the growing
Japanese hostility toward the American presence in Japan. 74 In
particular, a series of incidents in recent years, including a wellpublicized 1995 rape of a 12-year old Japanese girl by three U.S.
servicemen, has generated animosity toward the American troops.75
These events have "inflamed public opinion against the U.S. forces,
provoking anger in Okinawa, Tokyo, and Washington over the role of
the United States in the region."7 In addition, "when the Japanese
and American governments renegotiated the guidelines surrounding
the treaty in 1997, issues like these played a heavy role in extracting
American guarantees of cooperation in the event of criminal behavior
by its troops, and also Japanese promises of an expanded SDF role in
the event of a crisis near Japan."" Yet the U.S. presence in Japan
remains remarkably large." Together, there are more than 50,000
troops using over 100 military facilities, and employing over 20,000
Japanese in the process.79 With the recent closures of American bases
in the Philippines, Japanese bases remain key strategic sites in Asia
for the United States.'
III. Amending the Japanese Constitution
The question of amending the Japanese constitution raises two
concerns: first, what are the reasonable prospects for doing so and,
second, what does that mean for the legitimacy of constitutions in the
first place? Specifically, Japan's constitution requires a two-thirds
vote for revision."' Amendments must be initiated in the Diet
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Leheny, supra note 42, at 39.
Id.
Bugni, spura note 34, at 85.
Leheny, supra note 42, at 40.
Id.
Id.
See DRIFrE, supra note 27.
Id. at 38.
Id.
JAPAN CONST.art. 96.
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followed by the two-thirds approval in both houses. 2 The most
difficult hurdle, though, is that an amendment finally requires a
simple majority of the public in a special referendum.83 As a result of
these obstacles, there have been no such revisions since the
Interestingly, when the
constitution was adopted in 1947.'
constitution was first ratified after World War II, Japan could have
amended it once the occupation ended."5 However, the citizenry's
86
solid anti-war sentiment at the time prevented any such attempts.
Moreover, although the occupation technically ended in 1952, it
was not immediately clear what the American response would have
been had the Japanese attempted to revise the, constitution to
significantly alter the provisions of Article 9. After all, the United
States only became involved in the process by a default of sorts; it was
only when MacArthur learned of Japanese efforts to draft a new
constitution that he insisted the United States (MacArthur) take the
lead role.87 Of course, with the onset of the Korean War, the United
States came to be one the biggest proponents of revising Article 9 to
grant Japan more military sovereigntyY Since then, it has been the
Japanese populace itself that has resisted revision more than anyone
else.89

Despite the fact that the Japanese constitution technically
requires a two-thirds vote for revision, it may not be so easy in the
case of Article 9.' Still, one scholar has done a study of various
constitutions and determined that Japan's is actually easier to amend
than most other countries, including the United States." Matthew J.
Gilley notes that:
[Donald] Lutz has devised a complex, multi-factor
index for gauging the relative difficulties in amending
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
DOWER, supra,note 4, at 561.
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several different national constitutions.... In this
index, Japan rates a 3.25 score.... By way of
comparison, the United States, with a more difficult
amendment process, scores 5.10.... The average of
all thirty countries polled, plus the average score of all
American states' constitutions, produced an index of
3.26."'
Regardless of the relative ease of amendment, however, it simply has
not happened with Article 9, a direct result of lingering public
sentiment.93 Dower notes: "The constitution may well be revised in
the near future, but the issues involved still tell a great deal about
' Indeed, as
popular political consciousness in contemporary Japan."94
Dower notes, the constitution has been creatively interpreted, but as
yet not officially amended:
Although Article 9 has been battered and bent to
permit an increasingly expansive interpretation of
what is permissible in the name of maintaining a 'selfdefense' capacity, it has survived (together with the
strong anti-war language of the preamble) as a stillcompelling statement of the ideal of nonbelligerency.
The 'no-war' vision touched the hearts of people all
over the world in the wake of World War II, but it was
never encoded in another nation's constitution or
laws... .
In such unplanned ways, the early
occupation
ideals
of
'demilitarization
and
democratization' have remained a living part of
popular consciousness for over a half-century.9
At the same time, Article 9 might not be subject to amendment
at all.' Many commentators have noted that the Article is too
fundamental and central to the constitution as a whole.97 This issue
summons the age-old question of whether a constitutional
amendment can be unconstitutional.
Imagine if Americans
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to the constitution that gave the

government the right to seize private property without paying just
compensation. Such an amendment would clearly violate the 5 th
amendment to the constitution. Could the subsequent amendment
merely purport to repeal the 5th amendment, then? The constitution
does not directly address this issue. Still, most commentators believe
that certain portions of a constitution are so fundamental and integral
to its existence that amendment of those portions would be
unconstitutional. If there were no such protections, minority interests
would truly be subject to the tyranny of the majority.98
In Japan's situation, after 55 years, the public has come to
identify with the non-belligerency implicit and explicit in their
constitution. 9 As a result, much of the public may consider Article 9
to be inviolable. This perspective indicates that the constitution
cannot be amended as far as Article 9 is concerned, and that Japan
shall never have the right to maintain a military for anything other
than self-defense, a characteristic many Japanese have come to see as
uniquely Japanese." °
If the Japanese constitution cannot be amended, what does that
portend for the role of the United States military in the region?
Without the United States' protection, the SDF in its current state
would most likely be incapable of protecting Japanese interests in the
region, at least in conformity with the confines of Article 9. As a
result, it renders two positions incompatible: resisting amendment to
the constitution and advocating withdrawal of U.S. military forces
from Japanese territory.
This issue then leads to the question of what the treaties between
the United States and Japan amount to. As a sovereign nation, Japan
has the right to abrogate any treaties into which it enters, subject of
course to the diplomatic ramifications that would result. However, its
relationship with the United States is unique. After all, as the
victorious nation in World War II, the United States was in a position
to dictate the terms of surrender to Japan, and they did so in a way
that both drafted the terms of the Japanese constitution and
maintained a significant American military presence in the area. But
how long are those terms valid? It is a long-standing political and
diplomatic maxim that one should not hold historical grudges; this
98. See Federalist Papers No. 51.
99. See DOWER, supra note 4.
100. Id.
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logic may apply in this situation. But what if Japan had attempted to
kick out American forces in 1953, the year the occupation officially
ended? At that time, the United States still controlled Japan for all
intents and purposes, sufficient at least to be able to refuse the order.
But 50 years have now passed; does the same logic apply? And if not,
when did it change? It may be illustrative that when told to leave the
Philippines, the United States packed up its bags and left. It is
doubtful, though, that the same response would be as forthcoming in
Japan, given the specifics of the history of the past half-century.
IV. Conclusion
A sovereign country is accountable only to itself with regard to
its own system of laws. In that respect, Japan undoubtedly has the
right to amend or replace its constitution, just as the United States
replaced the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution in 1789.
When the United States ended its occupation of Japan in 1953, it
effectively left to Japan the power to govern itself, which necessarily
includes decisions regarding its own structure of laws. Certainly, any
decisions Japan may have made at the time would have been subject
to international pressure or even military response; this, however,
merely reinforces the "might makes right" maxim, and says nothing
of a country's natural right to amend its own constitution. Thus,
Japan does have the right to change Article 9 and its constitution,
even if it does not have the inclination, and even if international
pressure might preclude such an event.
However, amending the constitution will not necessarily lead to a
removal of United States troops from Japanese soil. From one
perspective, a nation once-conquered need not remain conquered
forever. In that regard, Japan has at least a moral right to dictate to
the United States whether it can or cannot maintain military troops
on its territory. But from another perspective, morals have never
won wars; might has. And international law, if there is such an entity,
is enforceable, like any system of laws, only at the butt of a gun. As a
consequence, it cannot be said that the United States does not have a
"right" to maintain a military presence in Japan, until they are forced
to leave.
Moreover, the historical record only gives more weight to the
argument. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution may not be subject
to amendment, and Japan continues to recognize mutual security
treaties with the United States. More importantly, both the United
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States and Japan recognize the mutual benefit the two countries have
derived from their post-World War II relationship. Just as many
Japanese appreciate the importance of American protection, many
Americans understand the strategic necessity of a military presence in
Japan. As long as those facts remain, the United States military likely
will remain in Japan as well.

